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THE GRAYING OF KOREA: ADDRESSING THE CHALLENGES OF AGING
By Jerald Schiff and Murtaza Syed
Introduction
This past year—2007—was another solid one for 
Korea’s economy. Buoyed by continued strong ex-
ports and a pickup in domestic demand, real GDP is 
estimated to have grown by nearly 5 percent in 2007, 
similar to the previous year, while inflation remained 
well under control, at about 2.5 percent on average 
for the year. Prospects for this year are also generally 
favorable, with growth expected by the IMF to moder-
ate slightly, to about 4.5 percent, in line with slowing 
global growth and inflation remaining moderate.
It is true, of course, that the current volatility in global 
financial markets has intensified risks to this outlook. 
The direct impact on the Korean financial system of 
the ongoing global turmoil related to the U.S. subprime 
crisis appears limited. But with a sharp slowdown in 
the United States and the European Union, Korea’s 
exports—along with those of the rest of Asia—would 
surely slow. Higher oil prices also have the potential 
to slow growth and raise inflation pressures. Never-
theless, Korea seems well positioned to weather any 
such contingencies.
In the longer run, however, Korea faces a sterner test. 
In particular, a rapidly aging population will threaten 
Korea’s growth potential and impose enormous fiscal 
pressures. These issues are not unique to Korea—other 
advanced economies are also growing older—but 
Korea is aging faster than perhaps any other country 
in history. Without a forceful policy response to this 
dramatic shift, the Korean labor force will begin to 
decline within the next decade,1 while spending on 
pensions, health care, and long-term care will rise 
precipitously over the next half century.
The good news is that the full effect of these pres-
sures should not be felt for several decades. There is, 
then, still time to address these problems. Moreover, 
Korea’s history of fiscal prudence provides confi-
dence that the necessary steps will be taken. But the 
window of opportunity is actually much smaller than 
one might think, and early action will be needed to 
allow a smooth transition to a significantly older Ko-
rea. More concretely, the key will be to use a broad 
range of policy tools, including pension and health 
care reform; tax base broadening and improved tax 
collection; a reallocation of public expenditures; and 
measures to boost labor force participation rates of, in 
particular, women and older workers. Perhaps the first 
step is to move the policy debate forward by raising 
consciousness of the challenges ahead and laying out 
policy options.
The Graying of Korea
Koreans are living longer and having far fewer chil-
dren than in their past. As a result, the country is facing 
a rapid aging of its population. In particular, Korea’s 
fertility rate has fallen from around 6 in 1960 to just 
over 1 in 2006, among the lowest in the world. At 
the same time, life expectancy has increased from 53 
in 1960 to the current 77 and is projected to rise by 
another 7 years over the next half century.
These changes will have far-reaching effects on Ko-
rean society. The old-age dependency ratio (the ratio 
of the elderly to the working-age population), a critical 
indicator, will rise from 13 percent today to 65 percent 
in 2050. In other words, while today there are more 
than 7 persons of working age to support every older 
Korean citizen, in a bit more than 40 years—when 
those currently entering the labor force are retiring—
there will be only approximately 1.5 workers for each 
senior citizen. Korea is not the only country confront-
ing population aging, of course, but the speed and 
severity of its demographic transition is unmatched 
(Figure 1). As a result, Korea will be transformed 
in record time from one of the youngest populations 
1. “Population Projections for Korea: 2005–2050” (Seoul: Korea National Statistical Offi ce, 2006).
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in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) to among the oldest.
What does this mean for the Korean economy? First, 
the decline in working-age adults will, other things 
equal, reduce the growth potential of the Korean 
economy. Korea is already facing challenges to its 
growth because of a loss of its low-skilled manufactur-
ing base to China and other low-wage producers and 
of the resulting shift of Korean workers to the services 
sector, where productivity has been stagnant. Staff of 
the International Monetary Fund have projected that, 
absent reforms, these developments combined with the 
expected decline in the labor force will lead to roughly 
a halving of Korea’s potential growth, from the current 
4.5 percent to something more like 2 percent over the 
long term.2
 
But this is only part of the story. In addition, with the 
graying of Korea, public age-related expenditures 
could increase by as much as 11 percent of GDP over 
the next half century. This reflects a rise in pensions 
of four to five percentage points of GDP, and a rise in 
health care and long-term-care expenditures of six to 
seven percentage points of GDP.3 Reflecting the sever-
ity of population aging in Korea, this rise in spending 
dwarfs the expenditure pressures faced by a number 
of aging industrial countries in Europe and is almost 
three times as large as for the average Group of Seven 
economy. Without appropriate measures, this trend 
will eventually threaten Korea’s traditionally sound 
fiscal stance and severely constrain its macroeconomic 
performance.
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Figure 1: Age-Related Expenditure Pressures and Dependency Ratios in the Group of Seven and in 
Korea, 2005–50 (est.)
Sources: European Commission, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and International 
Monetary Fund staff calculations.
2. V. Chensavasdijai,2006. “Korea’s Transition to a Knowledge-Based Economy: Prospects and Challenges Ahead,” in Republic 
of Korea: Selected Issues, IMF Staff Country Report, no. 06/381 (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 2006), www.
imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2006/cr06381.pdf.
3. The projected rise in public pension expenditure is based on government estimates, while the rise in public health spending 
is based on OECD projections; see “Projecting OECD Health and Long-Term Care Expenditures: What Are the Main Drivers?” 
Economics Department Working Papers, no. 477, ECO/WKP (Paris: OECD, 2006), http://masetto.sourceoecd.org/vl=4163310/
cl=11/nw=1/rpsv/cgi-bin/wppdf?fi le=5l9x36wg1cxs.pdf.
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The Fiscal Challenge
How big a fiscal problem could Korea face? One way 
to put this into perspective is to think about what might 
happen if policies stay unchanged and nothing is done 
to accommodate the spending pressures generated by 
population aging (Figure 2). Given Korea’s history of 
fiscal prudence, it is highly likely that the government 
would in fact take steps to deal with these pressures, 
but examining the implications of such a baseline 
is a useful way to gauge the size of the adjustment 
required.
the coming years because attempting to adjust once the 
debt dynamics turn unfavorable would, as discussed 
below, be considerably more painful.
What options, then, does Korea have to address its 
long-run fiscal challenges? And what can be said 
about the optimal mix of such policies? We turn to 
these questions next.
Halting the Tide: What Can Be Done?
Fortunately for Korea, it is not the first country to face 
fiscal pressures from aging, and it has the opportunity 
to learn from the experiences of others. Most OECD 
countries have already taken steps to ensure fiscal 
sustainability in the face of aging populations, notably 
by reforming their pension systems. Moreover, despite 
the nearly unprecedented magnitude of the fiscal pres-
sures it faces, Korea benefits from several advantages 
compared with most industrial economies now con-
fronting large increases in age-related expenditures: 
Korea is growing faster, has more scope for boosting 
revenue, and has a relatively low level of public debt. 
These traits provide it with relatively more room to 
maneuver.
Korea has a number of options to meet the population-
aging challenge and ensure fiscal sustainability. First, 
demographic projections are not etched in stone, and 
the shift described above would be eased if the fertil-
ity rate in Korea could be raised to slow the projected 
decline in the working-age population. Equally, poli-
cies to boost long-term growth, notably raising service 
sector productivity and ensuring that manufacturing 
continues to move up the value-added chain, would 
help meet some of the spending needs. Realistically, 
however, given the size and speed of the expected 
transition, aging is not a problem that Korea can 
outgrow or reverse solely on the basis of population 
planning. Accommodating the resulting expenditure 
pressures is likely to require significant changes in 
fiscal polices.
Increase Workforce Size by Boosting Participation
To help offset the projected decline in the working-
age population, steps could be taken to increase the 
share of the working-age population in the labor 
force, particularly for women and older workers. The 
overall participation rate in Korea is below the OECD 
average, mainly because participation for prime-age 
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Figure 2: Macroeconomic Effects of 
Unchanged Policies in Korea, 2005–50 (est.)
Source: Korean authorities and International 
Monetary Fund staff estimates.
Our analysis suggests that, without any adjustment 
(such as measures to raise revenue or reduce other gov-
ernment spending), increasing pension and health care 
expenditures are likely to push the fiscal balance into 
substantial deficit in coming decades. To finance this 
spending, the government will likely be forced to bor-
row, resulting in a mushrooming of the public debt and 
running up an increasing interest bill. The next several 
decades look deceptively benign, mainly because the 
still quite new pension system will continue to run 
surpluses and accumulate assets. But fiscal deficits 
and the debt burden will eventually begin to rise very 
rapidly, leading to other macroeconomic imbalances 
as growth is severely constrained and strong private 
domestic demand, supported by the large public spend-
ing, results in a sharp rise in imports and a ballooning 
current account deficit. It is crucial that the govern-
ment take advantage of the window provided during 
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women (ages 25 to 49) is the third lowest in the OECD. 
The difficulty for women of combining child rearing 
and work outside the home (for example, because of 
short parental leave and the high cost and low quality 
of child care) is a key barrier to labor force participa-
tion. And Korea’s seniority-based wage system leads 
to the common practice of firms’ setting a mandatory 
retirement age well below the full pension eligibility 
age of 60. Key steps then would include boosting 
women’s participation through family-friendly polices 
and creating conditions to encourage older workers 
to stay at firms, perhaps by making the wage system 
less tied to seniority and putting in place a corporate 
pension system to replace the retirement allowance 
system that makes it expensive for companies to retain 
employees.4
Comprehensive Pension Reform
To meet the rising pension needs of its aging popula-
tion, Korea needs to consider a thorough reform of its 
public pension system. Introduced only 20 years ago, 
Korea’s National Pension Fund (NPF) is a relatively 
young system, and its assets will continue to build up 
over the medium term, peaking in the mid-2030s at 
close to 50 percent of GDP. As the number of pension 
recipients increases, however, the system’s assets are 
projected to diminish rapidly.
4. Under the retirement allowance system, fi rms are obliged to pay as a lump sum upon termination of employment at least one 
month of salary for each year that a worker was employed. Older workers are thus more expensive to retain as they are likely 
to require a bigger payment, both because of their longer job tenure and because their fi nal salary, upon which the allowance is 
based, is usually higher under Korea’s seniority-based wage system.
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 3558
60
62
64
66
68
Korea France Turkey
Australia
Canada
Mexico
Japan Belgium
Luxembourg
Sweden
Germany
Greece
United
Kingdom
Spain Poland
Italy
Czech Republic
Ireland
Iceland
United
States
OECD
average
Retirement age
Contribution rate (percentage)
Source: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.
Figure 3: Comparison of Pensions in OECD Countries, 2007
The government passed a pension reform in 2007, 
under which the replacement rate (pension payment 
as a share of average lifetime earnings) will be gradu-
ally reduced by 2028 from the current 60 percent to 40 
percent. Although this reform will delay the pension 
fund’s depletion, it does not resolve the NPF’s prob-
lems: without further action, the assets of the pension 
fund would still be depleted, but depletion would occur 
13 years later than the pre-reform date of 2047.
What more can be done? First, in line with rising life 
expectancy, consideration could be given to raising 
the retirement age toward OECD levels. At 60, the 
retirement age in Korea remains well below the OECD 
average of approximately 65. Second, there is some 
scope for raising pension contribution rates: Korea, 
together with Australia, has the lowest rate among 
OECD countries—9 percent compared with an average 
of about 20 percent (Figure 3). Of course, neither of 
these alternatives is particularly appealing and could 
be difficult to achieve politically.
In this context, it is worth noting that broadening the 
contribution base would both boost the pension sys-
tem’s revenue and limit the need to raise contribution 
rates or reduce benefits. In Korea, there is tremendous 
scope for such a policy: more than one-third of Korea’s 
labor force does not contribute to the national pension 
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system (compared with less than one-sixth for the 
OECD as a whole). This mainly reflects the large num-
ber of self-employed and non-regular workers who 
reportedly fail to properly state their taxable incomes. 
The base has also been eroded by generous allowances 
that decrease taxable wages and a relatively low ceil-
ing on the contribution base, which has been fixed in 
nominal terms for the past 20 years. If revenues could 
be boosted by bringing more workers into the system 
as allowances are capped and the contribution ceiling 
raised, the pension fund could be placed on a sound 
financial footing with only a modest adjustment in 
contribution or replacement rates.
Moreover, it appears that the pension fund is not 
maximizing the returns on its considerable assets. In 
particular, because the fund is projected to keep ac-
cumulating assets over the next two decades, boosting 
the rate of return could have sizable benefits and would 
go a long way toward placing it on a sounder financial 
footing. Since 2000, the NPF has earned a real return 
of around 4 percent per year, barely keeping up with 
the growth in real per capita incomes in Korea. By 
contrast, the rate of return for a number of other public 
pension funds, such as those in Canada, New Zealand, 
and Sweden, has been almost twice as high as the real 
return in Korea. What explains this large gap?
• The investment portfolio of the NPF is not very 
well diversifi ed in terms of either asset class or 
geographic allocation. In 2006, the NPF allocated 
only 10 percent of its portfolio to equity invest-
ments, with bonds making up almost all of the 
rest. And only about 10 percent of its investments 
were made abroad. Public pension funds in the 
three aforementioned economies tend to invest a 
much higher proportion of their assets in equities 
(between 60 to 75 percent) and in investments 
outside their home countries (around 50 percent).
• Governance and management of the NPF are dif-
ferent from those in comparable economies. Falling 
under the Ministry of Health and Welfare, staff who 
make the pension fund’s investment decisions are 
not insulated from government infl uence and can 
be guided by public policy considerations. There 
may be merit in exploring ways to bring the fund’s 
governance closer to best international practice, 
notably by establishing an independent professional 
body to manage pension fund assets, as is being 
considered by the government; focusing explicitly 
on maximizing risk-adjusted returns and minimiz-
ing public policy considerations; replacing strict 
limits on investment with a transparent structure 
and sound prudential requirements; and increasing 
the role of external specialists—including auditors, 
actuaries, and asset managers.
Even if comprehensive pension reform is imple-
mented, however, rising health care costs would still 
threaten Korea’s long-term public finances. There-
fore, further measures to raise government revenues, 
reform the health sector, or contain other government 
expenditure would be needed. Below, we consider 
some options.
Tax reform
There appears to be considerable scope for boosting 
tax revenue collections to accommodate Korea’s 
future spending needs. At approximately 25 percent, 
the general government revenue-to-GDP ratio is very 
low relative to most OECD countries. For all major 
taxes in Korea, there is considerable scope for increas-
ing revenues through base broadening, even without 
increases in tax rates. Key options include:
• Personal income tax (PIT). Although personal 
income tax rates in Korea are broadly in line with 
those in most countries, PIT yields are noticeably 
low, at 3 percent of GDP compared with an OECD 
average of 10 percent. A key reason behind this di-
vergence is that relatively few people in Korea pay 
PIT: in 2003, the bottom 80 percent of wage and 
salary employees in the tax system accounted for 
only 10 percent of taxable income, while the bottom 
half had virtually no taxable income. This partly 
refl ects generous wage deductions and the large 
number of allowable exemptions—such as those 
for insurance premiums, medical expenses, and 
education expenses—which are not subject to an 
overall ceiling. Capping such deductions and hon-
oring related sunset clauses would help to broaden 
the PIT tax base. Improving tax administration by 
intensifying the auditing of the self-employed and 
strengthening penalties for misreporting income 
could also help.
• Corporate income tax (CIT). Corporate income 
tax is a core source of revenue in Korea, accounting 
12 THE KOREA ECONOMIC INSTITUTE 
for 3 percent of GDP or 14 percent of total taxes, 
the latter the fourth largest among OECD countries. 
That makes it important to safeguard this source 
of revenue by limiting tax incentives that, in any 
case, are often ineffective in delivering intended 
results.5 Honoring sunset provisions that exist for 
the elimination of various CIT incentives and in-
troducing similar clauses for other special schemes 
(including those for various zones for foreign direct 
investment) would help. In addition, publishing on 
a regular basis ex post estimates and projections of 
revenue losses from tax incentives (so-called tax 
expenditures) would enhance fi scal transparency 
and contribute to the public debate on the use of 
tax exemptions.
• Value-added tax and excises. Korea makes rela-
tively heavy use of consumption taxes, which raise 
more than one-third of all tax revenue. Korea’s VAT 
rate of 10 percent is less than the OECD average 
of around 18 percent, however, and the VAT yield 
is around 4.5 percent of GDP compared with the 
OECD average of 7 percent. Although the Korean 
VAT is well designed, base broadening in line with 
international best practice could be a potentially 
signifi cant source of additional revenue. In particu-
lar, there is scope for reexamining some of the less 
standard zero rates and exemptions, with a view to 
their elimination. To help offset any adverse impact 
on the most vulnerable, payments under social 
assistance programs could be adjusted upward. In 
the longer run, when gains from base broadening 
are exhausted, consideration could also be given to 
raising the VAT rate if necessary.
Expenditure reform
On the expenditure side, discipline with respect to 
spending that is not age related and cost efficiency 
gains from health care reforms would also help. Today, 
approximately 60 percent of total central government 
expenditure in the median OECD country is in age-
related categories such as education, health, and social 
protection; in Korea these expenditures come to only 
around 25 percent. In particular, Korea allocates a 
relatively large share of GDP to public investment 
and economic affairs. The scope in Korea for reduc-
ing spending that is not age related appears limited, 
however, because overall public spending is already 
relatively low in Korea: at around 23 percent of GDP, 
total general government spending is around fifteen 
percentage points of GDP less than the average OECD 
economy and is the lowest after Mexico. Moreover, 
the government will likely face additional spending 
pressures from other sources, including its desire to 
strengthen the social safety net as well as the highly 
uncertain but potentially very large expenditures that 
could arise from reunification with North Korea.
What about health care reform? The projected growth 
of public expenditures on health and long-term care 
could be slowed, for example, by increasing contri-
bution rates to the National Health Insurance (NHI). 
However, it is hard to argue that significant additional 
costs should be shifted to the consumers because the 
current system already puts a significant financial 
burden on them: it is estimated that the NHI finances 
only about 40 percent of total health care expenditure 
while consumers pay 42 percent; the remainder is 
covered by revenues from general tax, earmarked 
tobacco tax, and private insurance. In contrast, there is 
considerable scope for cost containment, for example, 
by implementing strict supply-side controls (including 
prices of inputs and fee charges) and enlarging the role 
of private health insurance schemes.6
Why Worry Now?
Given that these pressures are still some decades 
away, it may be tempting to delay reform until the 
problems begin to manifest themselves more vis-
ibly. Such a strategy would be significantly more 
costly and disruptive. The closer to the time that ac-
tion is undertaken, the larger the size of the required 
measures: to accommodate rapidly rising spending 
pressures, tax hikes will need to be larger and public 
services will need to be dramatically reoriented, with 
adverse macroeconomic impacts in the form of sizable 
6. See OECD Reviews of Health Care Systems: Korea (Paris: OECD, 2003).
5. For a review of the empirical evidence, see H. Zee et al., “Tax Incentives for Business Investment, Primer for Policymakers in 
Developing Countries,” World Development 30, no. 9 (2002): 1497–1516.
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declines in private consumption and investment, large 
current account deficits, and lower long-term growth. 
No matter what the precise package of reforms, the 
earlier the actions are taken, the less painful the adjust-
ment because the needed realignment of revenue and 
expenditure policies can be more modest.
Acting earlier would not only entail a more modest 
fiscal effort but also deliver a bigger bang for the 
buck. If measures are taken within the next decade 
or so, for example, rather than later when the full 
effects of population aging begin to be felt around 
the mid-2030s, the size of the needed tax rate hikes 
or expenditure cuts, or both, could be reduced by 
one-third, while the macroeconomic environment 
would remain much more favorable. Implementing 
a combination of modest policies in a broad range of 
areas may not only introduce fewer distortions into the 
economy and generate superior long-run macroeco-
nomic outcomes but may also prove more politically 
palatable, particularly if making reforms in any one 
area is deemed too difficult.
As elsewhere, of course, generating political and 
public support for the needed reforms will be difficult. 
Several industrialized countries that are facing fiscal 
pressures from changing demographics, including 
Australia, New Zealand, and the UK as well as the 25 
member states of the European Union, have found that 
publishing a regular and publicly available long-term 
fiscal report can help to address long-term challenges 
in a comprehensive manner. Moreover, by helping to 
stimulate public debate and create an awareness of 
looming pressures that weigh on the conduct of fiscal 
policy, such reports can make it easier to build con-
sensus around needed reforms. With the publication 
of its Vision 2030 report, the Korean government has 
taken an important first step.
More can be done. Notably, the Korean government 
can project the long-term fiscal consequences of exist-
ing policies (the so-called bottom-up approach) as well 
as quantify the changes in revenue and expenditure 
that would be needed to achieve certain prespecified 
fiscal objectives, such as maintaining some desired 
level of public debt (the top-down approach). Under 
the top-down approach, a range of scenarios could be 
presented, each capturing a different manner in which 
spending and taxes can be adjusted to meet long-term 
fiscal objectives and illustrating trade-offs that are 
likely to be faced.
Conclusion
Aging faster than perhaps any other country in his-
tory, Korea is facing an unprecedented demographic 
shift. During the coming decades, Korea will be 
transformed in record time from one of the youngest 
populations in the OECD to among the oldest. In turn, 
this shift will challenge Korea’s growth prospects and 
put tremendous pressure on the pension system and 
on expenditures for health care and long-term care, a 
situation that could lead to mushrooming debt levels 
and macroeconomic imbalances unless remedial ac-
tions are taken.
On the positive side, Korea has a tradition of fiscal 
prudence that inspires confidence that it will take steps 
to ensure that its fiscal position remains sound in the 
face of these pressures. Moreover, Korea benefits from 
a number of favorable initial conditions, notably still 
solid rates of economic growth, considerable scope 
for increasing tax revenue, and a low level of public 
debt. However, the unprecedented speed and magni-
tude of its demographic transition leave a relatively 
narrow window of opportunity. The key to achieving 
long-term fiscal sustainability is to act early and with 
a range of policy tools, including pension and health 
care reform, tax base broadening, improved tax ad-
ministration, some reallocation of public expenditures, 
and boosting labor force participation rates of women 
and the elderly. Provided that the pressures associated 
with rapid aging are addressed early and with a judi-
cious combination of measures, there is no reason why 
Korea cannot in coming decades continue to command 
a place at the center stage of the global economy.
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